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INCOME TAX - CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
- DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSES
The corporate taxpayer adopted a plan of liquidation and sold
its assets realizing capital gain in excess of ten thousand dollars.
Within twelve months of the adoption of the plan, the taxpayer
distributed the proceeds of the sale, less amounts retained to meet
claims, to its stockholders. The gain realized was not reported as
income on the corporation's tax return for the year of liquidation
because of the non-recognition provisions of section 337 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code,1 but the taxpayer claimed as an ordinary and
necessary business expense, pursuant to section 162(a) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, 2 $9,500 in legal expenses incurred directly in the
sale of the capital assets. The Commissioner denied the deduction
on the grounds that the expenses were capital in nature and, there-
fore, not deductible as a business expense. The taxpayer contended
that the legal fees qualified as ordinary and necessary expenses of
liquidation and were deductible as such. The Tax Court held for
the taxpayer, 3 and the Commissioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Held, reversed. To allow the tax-
payer's deduction would run contrary to established principles of
taxation and would subvert the legislative purposes of section 337.
Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974).
The issue raised by Of Course, Inc. is whether legal fees re-
lated to the sale of capital assets and incurred by a corporation
pursuant to a section 337 liquidation, qualify as a business expense
under section 162(a). The problem arises from the hybrid nature
of the expenses. On the one hand the expenses are capital in na-
ture, stemming from the sale of capital assets; while on the other
£ INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337. This provides:
(a) General rule. If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after
June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adop-
tion of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in
complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or
loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by
it of property within such 12-month period.
2 Section 162(a) provides generally that the expenses incurred in the ordinary
and necessary course of business shall be deductions from ordinary income.
Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 146 (1971).
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hand the expenses are of an ordinary and necessary nature, stem-
ming from a liquidation.4
As a general rule, the costs of selling a capital asset are not
business expenses within section 162(a) but are offset against the
proceeds of that sale to reduce the realized gain.' Had the taxpayer
not elected to use the section 337 provision, this general rule would
have applied, and the capital gain, less expenses, would have been
recognized for tax purposes.' Section 337, however, provides that
the liquidating corporation may elect not to recognize the gain or
loss from liquidation sales. Since no capital gain is recognized,
there is no taxable capital gain to be reduced by the related capital
selling expenses; the corporation loses the tax-reducing impact
such an expense would ordinarily have.7
If section 337 is employed, the capital gain is not recognized
by the corporation; rather the gain is taxed when it is distributed
to the stockholders. However, the selling expense cannot be used
to reduce the corporation's tax liability, because the corporation
does not report the capital gain. As far as taxes are concerned, the
selling expense incurred is useless.
Confronted by such a situation, the taxpayer chose to deduct
the expense under section 162(a) as a liquidation expense pursuant
to the ruling of Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. Commissioner.' In that
decision, the Tax Court held liquidation expenses to be deductible
as business expenses because liquidations, while not a common
occurrence for the individual company, are nonetheless an ordi-
nary occurrence in the business community as a whole.' Addition-
ally, a liquidating company must necessarily incur expenses in
order to dispose of and account for the assets it has accumulated.
The taxpayer in Of Course argued that the legal fees incurred
' Uzel & Marx, Selling Expenses in 337 Liquidations: Are They Deductible?,
33 J. TAXATION 290, 291 (1970).
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 574-75 (1970).
Otto F. Ruprecht, 20 CCH TAx CT. REP. 618 (1961).
7 For example, assume the liquidating corporation realized a five thousand
dollar capital gain from a liquidation sale of assets but incurred legal expenses of
one thousand dollars in the process. Had section 337 not been elected, the selling
expense of one thousand dollars would offset the capital gain of five thousand
dollars and a net gain of four thousand dollars would be recognized for taxes. The
selling expense serves to reduce the amount of capital gain taxed, and this reduces
tax liability as well.
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during the sale of capital assets were necessitated by the liquida-
tion and were, therefore, deductible as liquidation business expen-
ses.
The taxpayer was upheld under the Pacific Coast rationale in
Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner." The primary issue in
Pridemark was whether the Tax Court correctly ruled that the
taxpayer had not liquidated but had, in fact, merely reorganized;
since no liquidation had occurred, the taxpayer's deduction of legal
fees incurred in the sale of capital assets was also denied.', The
Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the liquidation issue and,
in an almost incidental manner, allowed the taxpayer to deduct
the selling expenses as a business expense, citing Pacific Coast as
authority. 12 The decision contained no in-depth analysis of the
deduction issue, and thus, this issue was apparently not considered
by the court.
However, the issue was raised in United States v. Mountain
States Mixed Feed Co.,13 a Tenth Circuit decision, and once again
the taxpayer was upheld under the Pacific Coast rationale." The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the expenses involved were re-
lated to a capital sale; nonetheless, the court also acknowledged
that the expenses were related to a liquidation and held the latter
relationship to be the stronger of the two. The court said that to
draw a distinction between the expenses related to a capital sale
during liquidation and liquidation expenses in general would serve
no useful purpose, because the capital sale expenses would not
have been incurred had the corporation not been in liquidation. 1
Since liquidation expenses were ordinary and necessary and since
the capital sale expenses were incurred as a part of the liquidation,
logically the capital sale expenses were ordinary and necessary."
As one commentator noted, the court seemed to propose a "but
for" test-any expense that would not have been incurred "but
for" the liquidation was deductible as a business expense. 7
10 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
" 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
z2 345 F.2d at 45.
13 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966).
" Accord, Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir.
1966).
"1 365 F.2d at 245.
5 MId.
165 MICH. L. lay. 1508, 1512 (1967).
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Several lines of reasoning have appeared in subsequent deci-
sions to counter Pridemark and Mountain States.8 First, the de-
duction has been held to violate the general principle of tax law
that the costs of producing income are to be accorded the same tax
character as the income produced. 9 As in Of Course, the expenses
had produced capital income that would not be recognized by the
corporation for tax purposes due to section 337; therefore, if the
capital gain were to be of no tax consequence to the corporation,
then neither should the expense of generating that gain.
Second, to allow a deduction would defeat the legislative pur-
pose of section 337.2o Prior to the enactment of section 337, a liqui-
dation sale of assets by the corporation resulted in double tax
liability; not only was the corporation taxed on the gain, but the
stockholders were also taxed upon receiving the proceeds of the
sale. If on the other hand the assets had been distributed to, and
sold by, the stockholders, only the stockholders would be taxed on
any resulting gain. Such differential tax treatment hinged only
upon whether the assets were sold before or after their distribution
to the stockholders. These tax inequalities led Congress to enact
section 337.11 If the taxpayer were allowed to prevail, the tax ine-
qualities section 337 sought to erase would reappear. By deducting
the capital selling expense as a business expense, the corporation
receives the additional tax benefit of reducing its taxable ordinary
income while the capital gain attributable to the expense is not
taxed at all. Since ordinary income creates more tax liability than
capital gain, a net reduction in tax liability results, giving a tax
advantage to a sale of the assets by the corporation.
Third, to allow a business deduction for a capital expense on
the grounds that the expense was necessitated by a liquidation
poses rather ominous implications." For instance, a capital asset
might require renovation in order to be marketable in the corpora-
tion's liquidation sale. Admittedly, the expense is "necessitated"
by the liquidation, but to hold it deductible under section 162(a)
" See Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Lanrao, Inc. v.
United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); United
States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d
244 (7th Cir. 1967).
' Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Towanda
Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
SSEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258-60 (1954).
2 65 MicH. L. Rav. 1508, 1513 (1967).
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would permit a wide spectrum of traditionally capital expenses to
arguably be deductible business expenses.2
Fourth, the expenses incurred by the corporation in distribut-
ing the assets to the stockholders is not deducted by the corpora-
tion as a business expense, but is added to the basis of the asset;
this addition to basis is of no benefit to the corporation.4 The
denial of a deduction for the expenses incurred by the corporation
in selling the assets provides a more symmetrical treatment of
these expenses.
Finally, liquidation expenses have been given business deduc-
tion treatment on the theory that such expenses do not create, or
dispose of, a capital asset." Clearly, when a liquidation expense
does dispose of a capital asset, the business deduction treatment
is improper.
21
In light of these considerations, the ruling of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Of Course is more than justified. The decision not only
maintains congruence with the existing principles of tax law but
also serves to maintain the integrity of section 337. Of particular
importance is that the principal case27 expressly overrules
Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,"5 one of the pioneer decisions in
this area. Since Pridemark furnished the cornerstone for the tax-
payers' contentions in subsequent decisions, the precedential value
of those cases has been undermined, and the Commissioner's posi-
tion has been strengthened.
Gary L. Call
23 Id.
24 Eiseman, Section 337 Liquidations-Their Snares and Uncertainties, 22
ARK. L. REv. 300, 316 (1968).
" 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDEPAL INcohM TAXATION § 25.35, at 173-74, 182-83
(1972 rev. ed.).
26 Id. at 182-83.
21 Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754, 759 (4th Cir. 1974).
11 See the discussion of Pridemark in the text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
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